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ABSTRACT
is paper explores tracking and privacy risks on pornography
websites. Our analysis of 22,484 pornography websites indicated
that 93% leak user data to a third party. Tracking on these sites
is highly concentrated by a handful of major companies, which
we identify. We successfully extracted privacy policies for 3,856
sites, 17% of the total. e policies were wrien such that one
might need a two-year college education to understand them. Our
content analysis of the sample’s domains indicated 44.97% of them
expose or suggest a specic gender/sexual identity or interest likely
to be linked to the user. We identify three core implications of
the quantitative results: 1) the unique/elevated risks of porn data
leakage versus other types of data, 2) the particular risks/impact
for vulnerable populations, and 3) the complications of providing
consent for porn site users and the need for armative consent in
these online sexual interactions.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; •Social and professional topics→Privacy policies; Cor-
porate surveillance;
KEYWORDS
privacy, web tracking, pornography, consent, regulation
1 INTRODUCTION
One evening, ‘Jack’ decides to view porn on his
laptop. He enables ‘incognito’ mode in his browser,
assuming his actions are now private1. He pulls
up a site and scrolls past a small link to a privacy
policy. Assuming a site with a privacy policy will
protect his personal information2, Jack clicks on
a video. What Jack does not know is that incog-
nito mode only ensures his browsing history is
not stored on his computer. e sites he visits, as
well as any third-party trackers, may observe and
record his online actions. ese third-parties may
even infer Jack’s sexual interests from the URLs
of the sites he accesses. ey might also use what
they have decided about these interests for market-
ing or building a consumer prole. ey may even
sell the data. Jack has no idea these third-party
data transfers are occurring as he browses videos.
1Private browsing is used more oen when viewing ‘adult’ content; however, users
‘overestimate the protection from online tracking and targeted advertising,’ which is
scant (Habib et al., 2018: 159).
2See Turow et al. (2015a).
His assumption that porn websites will protect
his information, along with the reassurance of the
‘incognito’ mode icon on his screen, provide Jack
a fundamentally misleading sense of privacy as he
consumes porn online.
e above hypothetical scenario occurs frequently in reality and
is indicative of the widespread data leakage and tracking that can
occur on porn sites. In 2017, Pornhub, one of the largest porn
websites3, received 28.5 billion visits, with users performing 50,000
searches per second on the site (Pornhub, 2018). Statistics vary
as to the amount of overall porn activity on the internet, but a
2017 report indicated porn sites get more visitors each month than
Netix, Amazon, and Twier combined, and that ‘30% of all the data
transferred across the internet is porn,’ with site YouPorn using six
times more bandwidth than Hulu (Kleinman, 2017). While there is
much scholarly aention on internet use and privacy in general,
there has been less research on the specic privacy implications
of online porn use. Considering that porn websites are among the
most visited on the Internet (Alexa, 2018b), it is imperative to aend
to the specic privacy concerns of online porn consumption. Most
crucially, porn consumption data is sexual data, and thus constitutes
an especially sensitive type of online data users likely wish to keep
private.
Revelations about such data represent specic threats to personal
safety and autonomy in any society that polices gender and sexu-
ality. In this article, we demonstrate through the study of 22,484
pornography websites that people who visit such sites may have
their sexual interests inferred by third-parties that surreptitiously
track web browsing, oen without user notice or consent. We
provide quantitative results that reveal extensive privacy issues
on pornography websites and highlight three core implications of
our ndings: 1) the unique and elevated risks of porn data leakage
versus other types of data, 2) the targeting of ‘dierence’ and the
likelihood that the tracking of sexual data will especially impact
vulnerable populations, and 3) the complications of giving consent
to data collection and tracking for porn site users, and how these
problematic understandings of consent mirror more general mis-
conceptions and power imbalances of interpersonal sexual consent.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Porn Uses, Identity, and ‘Sexual Interests’
Pornography and sexually explicit material related to sex, sexual
orientation, gender performance, and sexual interests have long
served as sources of information, identity formation, support, and
3Pornhub is easily one of the largest porn sites in terms of content; in its rst 10 years,
more than 10 million videos were uploaded on the site (Pornhub, 2017).
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community. is has particularly been true for those whose sex-
ual interests are deemed deviant or abnormal, and thus must be
explored privately. Gross (2001: 221) explains, ‘..sexual images and
stories have generally been ocially condemned while privately en-
joyed. ey also have oered channels for the vicarious expression
and satisfaction of minority interests that are dicult, embarrassing,
and occasionally illegal to indulge in reality. . . ’ Porn can provide
community for those in areas hostile toward their identity (Gross,
2001). Despite online porn’s aordances for community, it remains
tied up in extant issues around power, agency and representation
in traditional porn industries (Mowlabocus, 2010).
We center private access to online porn as important to a queer,
feminist, sex-positive politics of gender and sexuality, and central
to community-building and free and safe sexual expression:
e existence of these sexual images is a threat
to those who guard the ramparts of the sexual
reservation. Visible lesbian or gay (or any uncon-
ventional) sexuality undermines the unquestioned
normalcy of the status quo and opens up the pos-
sibility of making choices that people might never
have otherwise considered. (Gross, 2001: 223)
When sex acts and identities are labeled abnormal or normal,all
are vulnerable. Sloop (2004: 8) notes ‘sex positive’ means, “to think
of sexual practices and sexuality as being organized into systems
of power that must be transgressed if we are to undermine the
constraining dimensions of culture on our behavior,” and, accord-
ing to Smith and Awood (2014: 13) is “. . . oen associated with
opposition to the regulation of sexual practices, the censorship of
sexual representations and restrictions on sex education.” Herein,
we take such a ‘sex positive’ view of porn and access to online
pornography. While acknowledging the many racist, misogynistic,
heteronormative and other problematic histories and themes in
pornography and its production, distribution and consumption4,
our work recognizes the ubiquity and permanence of porn and its
many uses and social functions, and the danger of societal, state,
and institutional narratives that might work to discipline gender
and sex.
Researchers are learning the many uses of porn, complicating
simplistic notions of what porn is ‘for.’ Porn consumption does
not necessarily equate to sexual identity, preference, pleasure, in-
terest, or fetish. For example, one may consume gay porn but not
identify as gay. Barker (2014: 149) notes the “rich variety” of re-
ported reasons for viewing porn, including: “for reconnection with
my body, to get in the mood with my partner, for recognition of
my sexual interests, to see things I might do, to see things I can’t
do, to see things I wouldn’t do, to see things I shouldn’t do, for
a laugh. . . ,” and more. Sexual playfulness is an important means
of exploring changing pleasures and preferences outside of strict
categorizations of identity that can stigmatize some interests (Paa-
sonen, 2018; Tiidenberg and Paasonen, 2018). us, when we note
a porn site or user’s ‘sexual interest’ or ‘sexual data’ is revealed
or could be inferred in tracking porn site visits, we do so with the
knowledge that porn serves a variety of uses and content consumed
does not explicitly indicate a person’s sexual or gender identity,
4SeeWilliams (2004) and Smith and Awood (2014), on the prominent theories, debates
and critiques of (online) pornography.
interest, desire, or anity5. Further, the site URLs oen suggest
specic genders and/or sexual preferences, genres, and acts found
in the site content. However, we believe if individuals’ porn use is
involuntarily exposed, such nuanced, sex-positive understandings
of porn and sexual interest will likely not gure into many outside
readings of user activities. us, we center the ability to privately
consume online porn as a right to sexual privacy, which Citron
(2019: 1898, 1901) notes, “is concerned with sexual autonomy,self-
determination, and dignity. . . ” and “. . . the extent to which others
have access to and information about people’s . . . sexual desires,
fantasies, and thoughts. . . ”
2.2 Online Tracking and Privacy
Although users may perceive a website or app as a single entity
(oen the address in their browsers), many sites and apps include
code from other parties of which users are typically unaware (Lib-
ert, 2015). Such “third-party” code can allow companies to monitor
the actions of users without their knowledge or consent and build
detailed proles of their habits and interests. Such proles are oen
used for targeted advertising, for example, by showing ads for dog
food to dog owners (Turow, 2012). Many websites and apps have
revenue sharing agreements with third-party advertising networks
and gain direct monetary benet from including third-party code
(Turow, 2012). However, tracking users on websites without ad-
vertisements can provide additional insights into their habits, and
online advertising companies like Facebook and Google oer web
developers a range of “free” non-advertising services subsidized by
allowing these companies to track users (Libert, 2015). For example,
a developer may include the Facebook “Like” buon on a website
to facilitate sharing content, which allows Facebook to track the
activities of all visitors - Facebook users or not. Decades of research
have demonstrated a variety of types of third-party tracking are
endemic on both web and mobile devices (Felten and Schneider,
2000; Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2006; Libert, 2015; Englehardt and
Narayanan, 2016; Binns et al., 2018).
e impacts of this tracking extend far beyond selling dog food.
A signicant body of literature has addressed the social implica-
tions of online consumer surveillance, including users’ aitudes
about being tracked (Barth and de Jong, 2017; Custers et al., 2014),
the mechanisms behind data mining and tracking (Kennedy, 2016),
how developers dene and design for privacy (Greene and Shilton,
2018), and surveillance as a technology of control within capitalism
(Campbell and Carlson, 2002). Collecting and tracking data are
oen framed as ways to ‘know’ quantitatively unknowable and
oen morally charged constructions like who or what is ‘average,’
‘normal,’ or ‘healthy’ (Ruckenstein and Pantzer, 2017: 408). Indeed,
van Dijck (2014: 198) states that ‘dataism’ demonstrates, “wide-
spread belief in the objective quantication and potential tracking
of . . . human behavior and sociality. . . (and) also involves trust in the
(institutional) agents that collect, interpret, and share (meta)data. . . ”
Despite the normalization of tracking, survey research consis-
tently demonstrates that users do not enjoy being tracked online
(Cranor et al, 2000; Turow et al, 2015a). Nissenbaum (2010: 2) argues,
“What people care most about is not simply restricting the ow of
5It also doesn’t necessarily reveal actions by the assumed device owner; porn con-
sumption can occur on someone’s device without their knowledge.
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information but ensuring that it ows appropriately.” Privacy poli-
cies, the primary means for users to learn about tracking, have been
consistently found inadequate due to users not understanding their
purpose (Smith, 2014), diculty understanding the dense legalese in
which they are wrien (McDonald and Cranor, 2008), and that such
policies fail to disclose 85% of observed instances of third-party
tracking (Libert,2018). Despite this, the online advertising industry
asserts users can “opt-out” of such tracking under a self-regulatory
framework referred to as ‘notice and choice’ or ‘notice and consent’
(Baruh and Popescu, 2017). While some point to a ‘privacy para-
dox’ between users’ expressed privacy preferences and their actual
behaviors, one compelling explanation is that ‘notice and consent’
is so confusing users are unable to ‘opt-out’ even if they wish to
do so (Smith, 2014). It is important to note the new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union is designed
to curb the practices described above by forbidding many forms of
third-party tracking without armative consent from users (Libert
and Nielsen, 2018). However, the GDPR does not apply world-wide
and its impacts are not yet clear.
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
is paper aims to ascertain the potential for surveillance and
tracking of pornographywebsite visitors and their associated sexual
data. Further, it explores theoretically-informed implications of data
leakage, tracking, and other security concerns related to privacy
and online pornography consumption. Although we use a global
sample of porn sites (loaded in the U.S.), and will note at points
in this article where global contexts might be especially relevant,
we approach this project from a U.S.-based culture, policy, and
privacy perspective. e research was conducted with the following
research questions:
• RQ1: To what extent do pornography websites potentially
reveal user data and allow for third-party identication
and tracking?
• RQ2: What entities/organizations tend to have the most
access to this data? Do the sites’ privacy policies disclose
tracking and the organizations with access to their data?
• RQ3: What is the potential for pornography website users’
sexual interests to be revealed or inferred by such surveil-
lance and tracking?
• RQ4: What are the potential implications of porn website
surveillance and tracking? What consequences for users
can be drawn from the results, especially informed by the-
ories of gender, sexuality and privacy, as well as relevant
prior cases?
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 Sample
In March 2018, we used a U.S.-based computer to analyze 22,484
pornography websites to identify the third-parties which may be
able to infer users’ sexual interests, and whether privacy policies
provide a sucient vehicle for obtaining meaningful consent to
tracking. To create our population of pornography websites, we
downloaded the homepages of the one million most popular web-
sites identied by the Alexa service6. Upon downloading the home-
page, we extracted the page meta description information (a short
summary of the page’s content provided by the site developer) and
page title. Our population of pornography websites is comprised of
sites with ‘porn’ in the URL, meta description, or title of the page.
‘Porn’ functions as an excellent identier as the text is rarely used
outside of the context of pornography as very few words other than
‘pornography’ contain the leer sequence ‘porn.’
4.2 Identifying ird-Parties on Websites
To identify third-parties found on a given website we used the
webXray soware platform. webXray ‘is a tool for analyzing third-
party content on web pages and identifying the companies which
collect user data’ (webXray, 2018). webXray functions by loading a
given web page in the Chrome web browser. During the page load,
webXray records all network trac so that instances where user
data is exposed to third-parties are identied. is network trac
is initially in a raw format and webXray ‘uses a custom library
of domain ownership to chart the ow of data from a given third-
party domain to a corporate owner, and if applicable, to parent
companies’ (webXray, 2018). For example, if a given page initiates
a request to the domain ‘2mdn.net’, webXray will reveal that the
page hosts code from DoubleClick, a subsidiary of Google, which is
in turn a subsidiary of Alphabet. webXray also records data on all
cookies set in the browser during page loading. Overall,webXray
provides ample data from which to investigate the nature and scope
of tracking on popular pornography websites.
4.3 Extracting and Analyzing Privacy Policies
is study examines the role of consent in online tracking and
we conducted an additional analysis of site privacy policies using
policyXray, a companion program to webXray (Libert, 2018). Once
a webXray analysis is completed, policyXray is used to locate the
privacy policy of a given page by searching for links containing text
such as ‘privacy’ and ‘privacy policy’. policyXray then loads the
privacy policy page in the Chrome web browser, injects the Mozilla
Readability.js library into the page, and extracts the page’s policy
(Libert, 2018). e extracted policy is then analyzed to determine
reading diculty, time needed to read the policy, and if the third-
parties detected collecting user data on the website are disclosed in
the policy.
policyXray searches not only for the identied owner of a given
tracker, but the parent companies as well, meaning the policy of a
page which initiates a request to ‘2mdn.net’ will be searched for
‘DoubleClick,’ ‘Google,’ and ‘Alphabet.’ Likewise, policyXray ac-
counts for spelling variations so that both ‘DoubleClick’ (one word)
and ‘Double Click’ (two words) are searched. Overall, policyXray
is designed to give as many chances as possible for disclosure to be
counted and is intentionally generous in this regard (Libert, 2018).
6Alexa, a subsidiary of Amazon, provides website trac metrics and rankings ‘based
on the browsing behavior of people in [a] global data panel which is a sample of all
internet users’ (Alexa, 2018a). Alexa’s data is imperfect, but is extensively used in the
web measurement literature.
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4.4 Content Analysis of Domain Names and
‘Sexual Interest’
To determine the extent to which the domain names of sites in
the sample could alone appear to reveal specic sexual/gender
preference, identity, or sexual topic of interest of the site content
or a site user, we conducted a content analysis of the site URLs.
Content analysis is used for making valid and replicable inferences
from texts to their context (Krippendor, 1980). It is a useful method
to employ when an individual investigator’s reading of a text proves
inadequate (Holsti,1969). We drew a representative random sample
of 378 site URLs from the larger population of 22,484. Condence
Level for the sample was 95% with a Condence Interval of 5.
We used four coders from diverse backgrounds: one primary
researcher and three volunteers. ree coders were women (one
identied her sexuality as uid; the others as queer), and one was
a heterosexual man. Coders were trained using a code book with
guidelines and examples for coding Presence or Absence of words
or phrases that ‘reveal or strongly suggest to the average user’ one
or more specic gender/sexual identities or orientations, or topics
of interest or focus. e ‘Presence’/‘Absence’ categories were de-
ned a priori based on theoretical understandings of gender and
sexuality. Coders were instructed to code Presence for: ‘Any word
or phrase that indicates or suggests the porn content will feature
a specic gender or sexual identity, orientation, or preference7,’
and/or ‘Any word or phrase that indicates or suggests the porn con-
tent will feature a specic sexual focus, body part or type, identity
or character (like race, nationality, ethnicity,religion, profession),
act, fetish, interest, porn genre, porn trope, etc.8’ Coders were in-
structed to code Absence indicating: ‘…the domain does NOT reveal
or strongly suggest to the average user one or more specic gender
or sexual: identities or orientations, and/or topic(s) of interest or
focus. Instead, the domain indicates generic porn/adult themes. . . 9’
Denitions and examples were wrien to render masculinity and
heterosexuality visible and thus not reinforced as normative10. Dur-
ing the 45-minute training, disagreements between coders were
discussed until consensus was established; the code book was re-
vised accordingly. All coders completed coding in less than one
hour, minimizing concerns of coder fatigue. Krippendor’s alpha,
a measure of reliability among coders, was .86, which falls within
an acceptable range (Krippendor, 2010).
4.5 Limitations
While we use a robust methodology, no study is without limitations.
Regarding the construction of our list, while it is the largest number
of pornography websites to be studied in the context of web track-
ing, it does not include all such websites, and due to the opaque
nature of the Alexa list it is impossible to quantify how reliable the
sample is overall. e Alexa list is used widely in the literature and
thus our study inherits a common weakness. Regarding measuring
7ese might include proper, slang, and/or derogatory words or phrases like: men,
gay, heterosexual, lesbian, transgender, dyke, chick.
8ese might include proper, slang, and/or derogatory words or phrases like: feet,
boobs, MILF, Latina, BBW, anal, incest, zoo, rape, secretary.
9ese might include: style of porn (Amateur, VR, cartoon), xxx, adult, sex, hot, mobile,
chat, vids, tube, free.
10Coders were encouraged to not categorize porn targeted to heterosexual men as
generic or Absence (e.g. ‘girl’ would be coded Presence, as would ‘boy;’ ‘doggystyle’
would be coded Presence, as would ‘bareback’).
Table 1: Top Tenird-Parties
Company % Sites Country Porn-Focused
Google 74 United States -
exoClick 40 Spain Yes
Oracle 24 United States -
JuicyAds 11 Netherlands Yes
Facebook 10 United States -
EroAdvertising 9 Netherlands Yes
Cloudare 7 United States -
Yadro 7 Russia -
New Relic 6 United States -
Lotame 6 United States -
third-parties with webXray, several limitations may apply. First,
due to a variety of factors including IP blacklisting and rate limiting,
the computer running webXray may be identifying as a ‘bot’ and
blocked by some websites. Likewise, some types of third-party
content may not load and will be missed by webXray. Overall, the
measures produced by webXray should be taken as low-bound mea-
sures, as the actual amount of tracking may be higher. Regarding
policyXray, limitations include the possibility extracted text does
not correspond to the actual policy, portions of the policy may
not be extracted, and policies may not load correctly due to issues
related to being marked a ‘bot.’ e content analysis has limitations
typical of the method. Namely, Wimmer and Dominick (2011:159)
note ndings: “are limited to the framework of the categories and
the denitions used in that analysis. Dierent researchers may
use varying denitions and category systems to measure a single
concept”. We worked to account for our theoretical and political
positionality in the dening of categories to make more transparent
these researcher inuences.
5 FINDINGS
Our March 2018 analysis successfully examined 22,484 sites drawn
from the Alexa list of one million most popular websites where
the URL, page title, or page description includes ‘porn.’ We found
third-party tracking is widespread, privacy policies are dicult to
understand and do not disclose such tracking, and third-parties
may oen be able to infer specic sexual interests based solely on
a site URL.
5.1 ird-Party Tracking
Our results indicate tracking is endemic on pornography websites:
93% of pages leak user data to a third-party; the pages that leak
data do so to an average of seven domains; 79% have a third-party
cookie (oen used for tracking); of the pages with cookies, there
is an average of nine cookies; and only 17% of sites are encrypted,
allowing network adversaries to potentially intercept login and
password details.11
We identied 230 dierent companies and services tracking users
in our sample. Such tracking is highly concentrated by a handful
of major companies, some of which are pornography-specic. Of
11Note that even if a homepage does not use encryption, a separate login page may;
however, it is now common practice to encrypt all pages.
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Table 2: Breakdown of Google Services Used
Service Name % Sites
Google APIs 50.1
Google Analytics 49
DoubleClick 11
Google Tag Manager 7
Blogger 2
YouTube 1
AdSense 1
non-pornography-specic services, Google tracks 74% of sites, Or-
acle 24%, Facebook 10%, Cloudare and Yadro 7%, and New Relic
and Lotame 6%. Porn-specic trackers in the top ten are exoClick
(40%), JuicyAds (11%), and EroAdvertising (9%). 171 companies and
services are present on fewer than 1% of sites, exhibiting a long-
tail eect. Figure 1 illustrates data ows between ve of the most
popular porn websites and several third-parties.
e majority of non-pornography companies in the top ten are
based in the U.S., while the majority of pornography-specic com-
panies are based in Europe. One reason may be diering cultural
and commercial norms towards sexual content. In the U.S., many
advertising and video hosting platforms forbid ‘adult’ content. For
example, Google’s YouTube is the largest video host in the world,
but does not allow pornography. However, Google has no policies
forbidding websites from using their code hosting (Google APIs)
or audience measurement tools (Google Analytics). us, Google
refuses to host porn, but has no limits on observing the porn con-
sumption of users, oen without their knowledge. Table 2 is a
breakdown of the use of Google services, and makes clear how
Google’s content policies have an impact on use for their services
by pornography websites.
5.2 Privacy Policies
We successfully extracted privacy policies for 3,856 sites, 17% of
the total. Major reasons for not extracting the policy of a given site
are that it does not have a privacy policy, the link for the policy
uses uncommon phrasing, or the structure of the page makes it
dicult to extract a policy URL (as with a modal window). We
found policies are wrien at a grade level 14 on the Flesch-Kinkaid
scale, meaning two years of college are estimated to be needed
to understand the policy. Policies have an average word count
of 1,750 and take seven minutes to read (McDonald and Cranor,
2008). Only 11% of third-parties observed tracking users on a given
page are listed in the policy, indicating users may have no means
to learn which companies might have troves of data about their
porn use. e diculty of understanding a policy indicates those
who do not have college-level education (and likely many that do),
may be unable to give informed consent on pornography websites.
Additionally, if the names of companies collecting user data are
missing, it is impossible for users to consent to the use of their data
for tertiary purposes.
5.3 Exposure of Sexual Interest
Based on a random sample, 44.97%12 of porn site URLs expose
or strongly suggest the site content includes or targets one or
more specic gender or sexual: identities or orientations, and/or
topic(s) of interest/focus. To elucidate: these porn domains con-
tain words or phrases that would likely be generally understood
as an indicator of a particular sexual preference or interest in-
herent in the site’s content, these might also likely be assumed
to be tied to the user accessing that content. As example, some
sites coded reliably across coders as exposing such interests in-
clude: ‘hp://bestialitylovers.com,’ ‘hp://boyfuckmomtube.com,’
and ‘hp://hdgayfuck.com.’ e remaining sites in the sample do
not make easily discernible the type of content on the site. Exam-
ples of these ‘generic’ domains include ‘hp://watch8x.com,’ and
‘hp://gohdporn.com.’ While we reiterate specic types of porn
do not necessarily indicate user gender/sexual identity or interest,
these results reveal the extent to which third-parties might assume
users’ specic sexual characteristics based on sites visited. Ven-
turing further into a site would provide an even more complete
understanding of the content therein.
6 DISCUSSION
Below we present three primary implications drawn from the re-
sults. Each combines our ndings with theoretical and empirical
grounding to make an argument related to sexual data and online
porn. First, we argue porn data leakage represents a unique and
elevated risk compared to many other types of data. We base this
argument on our quantitative results that reveal a large majority of
our sample leaked users’ sexual data to third-parties, combined with
the growing precedent for high-prole, large-scale leaks, hacks, and
missteps with sexual data. Next, we argue marginalized groups will
likely be most targeted and harmed by such tracking. e extent to
which gender and sexual interests could be inferred from site URLs
demonstrates the troubling potential for the tracking and disciplin-
ing of sexual interests labeled non-normative. ere is precedent for
such targeted abuse of women and other marginalized populations
online, and we contend their susceptibility to technological aacks
based on moral outrage point to wider societal vulnerabilities in the
face of constantly shiing socio-sexual norms. Finally, based on our
privacy policy ndings, we argue porn sites and other industrial
actors dealing in this data must acknowledge they are engaged in a
transaction involving sex and power, and thus require armative
sexual consent from users.
6.1 e Unique and Elevated Risks of Porn
Data Leakage
Most crucially, our results reveal the wide-scale privacy and security
risks of consuming online pornography. e high percentage of
site URLs that may reveal specic information about the content
that users access constitutes an opportunity for the linking of this
sensitive data to those users’ other tracked online activities and
proles. Turow et al. (2015b) and Turow (2017) demonstrated
12While 44.97% is alarming, the percentage may be even higher. Our 4 coders, although
diverse, could not possibly be aware of all sexual terms and slang in the URLs analyzed.
Likely some sites coded as generic actually contained references undetected by coders
without niche knowledge.
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Figure 1: Diagram of data ows to third-parties on major porn sites. Note Alphabet is the holding company of Google.
how the retail industries’ tracking and proling of shoppers lead
to discriminatory pricing practices and other privacy violations.
ose studies argue for the severity of the risks of such tracking. We
contend that the tracking of online porn consumption represents
an even riskier violation of privacy, in line with Citron’s (2019:1870,
1881) argument that:
Sexual privacy sits at the apex of privacy values
because of its importance to sexual agency, inti-
macy, and equality. We are free only insofar as
we can manage the boundaries around our bod-
ies and intimate activities… It therefore deserves
recognition and protection, in the same way that
health privacy, nancial privacy, communications
privacy, children’s privacy, educational privacy,
and intellectual privacy do.
While perhaps less publicly discussed than retail tracking, in recent
years porn and other sites related to sexual data have grabbed
headlines as they became targets of aack. In addition to the site
URLs studied herein, porn websites store a plethora of customer
information that, if the sites are hacked or if users are tracked online,
could potentially reveal specic users’ private sexual data. Between
2012 and 2018, at least 12 porn sites, sites tied to non-consensual
voyeurism, and sites for extramarital aairs were visibly breached
(Hunt, 2018). In some cases, these breaches caused signicant harm
to users and their families. e extra-marital site Ashley Madison
suered a prominent hack exposing 32 million names, credit card
numbers, email and physical addresses as well as sexual interests
of customers (Isidore and Goldman, 2015).
e particularly sensitive nature of data collected by porn web-
sites, combined with their comparatively lax security, can prove
irresistible to hackers. In a 2012 porn site aack, hackers said
the site’s mediocre security made it, ‘too enticing to resist’ (Geuss,
2012). e hackers stole data of more than 73,000 subscribers includ-
ing email addresses, passwords, usernames, and information from
40,000 credit cards (BBC,2012). Earlier that year, YouPorn suered
a major breach, exposing thousands of user emails and passwords
that promptly began circulating online (BBC, 2012). A website re-
lated to more specic sexual practices, Rosebuboard.com, a forum
about ‘extreme anal dilation and anal sting’ was hacked in 2016,
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resulting in more than 100,000 user accounts being exposed (Cox,
2016). In 2018, thousands of users who accessed a bestiality website
had personal details including email addresses, birth dates, and IP
addresses circulated on public image boards by hackers (Cox, 2018).
Malicious advertisements, delivered by the same types of third-
parties documented herein, have been found on many porn web-
sites, including xhamster, Pornhub and xvideos (Lee, 2013). One
malicious ad, running on Pornhub’s website for over a year, could
take control of a victim’s computer and click on other fake ads
to generate income for those operating the scheme (Grin, 2017).
Although malicious ads can be found on many websites, on porn
sites they are less likely to be reported by users based on the nature
of their visit to the site. Tracking across the web elevates the risks,
especially considering the large corporate entities we discovered
can potentially access user data through third-party requests, such
as Google and Facebook. Our results, combined with the precedent
for large-scale data leaks of online sexual data, illustrate the unique
and elevated risks associated with porn data leakage and tracking.
6.2 Targeting Dierence: Tracking Sexual Data
and Vulnerable Populations
Our results indicate that the URLs of 44.97% of the 22,484 sites in our
sample likely reveal a specic gender/sexual preference, identity or
interest related to the sites’ content. We argue revelations about
individuals’ porn use and the specic sexual content of sites they
visit are unlikely to publicly be granted the nuance due humans’
complex sexual interests, curiosities and identities 13. is aen-
ing is even more likely to occur online. As Marwick (2017: 180)
noted regarding two prominent online sexual privacy controversies:
‘. . . the same properties of social media that facilitate activism and
cultural participation can . . . enable networked abuse and targeted
intimidation.’ ose most likely to be impacted by online sexual
privacy violations are traditionally marginalized and vulnerable
communities, especially women, people of color, LGBTQ and other
marginalized gender/sexuality communities, and those whose sex-
ual interests are labeled deviant or abnormal in their community
(Citron, 2019).
Sexual interests typically coded as (hetero)normative become
invisible in the face of queer, ‘deviant,’ or ‘alternative’ interests
marked as dierence (Butler, 1993). at ‘dierence’ made visible
against a constructed sexual ‘norm,’ makes certain groups most
vulnerable to moralistic aacks based on sexual data. Plummer
(2003: 57) explains, ‘…the “sexual citizen” . . . occupies a classed, eth-
nicized, gendered, and age-grouped position in society. at is, not
all sexual citizens will be treated equally, fairly, in the same way. . . ’
Franks’ (2017: 431) notion of ‘intersectional surveillance,’ build-
ing on Crenshaw’s (1989) foundational work on intersectionality,
emphasizes that ‘those subjected to multiple sources of subordi-
nation are also subjected to multiple sources of surveillance.’ In
what Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) call ‘networked misogyny,’
women are singled out for a disproportionate share of online abuse.
‘Revenge porn,’ or non-consensual pornography, in which nude or
13Many domains in our sample illustrate how quickly nuance might be lost in favor
of exposure, panic and severe consequences. Sites like ‘momboysex.ws,’ ‘freerape-
porn.org,’ and ‘pornwithanimals.net’ would create scandal amid revelations they were
frequented by a public gure, as well as personal/professional fallout for an ordinary
citizen.
sexual photos or videos are spread without consent of the subject in
order to intimidate and cause harm, has impacted at least 4% of U.S.
internet users, or 10.4 million people (Lenhart et al., 2016). Women
and those who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual are the most fre-
quent victims of revenge porn and other forms of online harassment
and sexual privacy violations (Lenhart et al., 2016; Citron, 2019).
Chu and Friedland (2015: 3) explain that when women’s privacy is
violated and they are shamed online: ‘e message is… you deserve
no protection, no privacy. …Slut-shaming . . . blames the user—her
habits of leaking—for systemic (networked) vulnerabilities. . . ’ us,
surveillance and exposure are deployed to discipline dierence.
Moral judgments can lead to devastating consequences for any
sexual interests labeled ‘immoral’ (Warner, 1999: 5), especially
when these judgments are encoded into law. For example, same-sex
relations between consenting adults are criminalized in 70 United
Nations member states,with punishments ranging from imprison-
ment to death (Fox et al., 2019). e consequences of sexual privacy
violations in such contexts would clearly be severe. Even in soci-
eties with less regulation around sex, breaches of sexual privacy
oen have bodily stakes. In the U.S., the Ashley Madison hack-
ers were motivated by moral judgments about the site’s intended
user-base: people (mostly men) seeking extra-marital aairs. In
the breach, hackers threatened to release users’ names, addresses,
credit card transactions, and ‘secret sexual fantasies’ if the site
was not shut down. When the hackers did publicly post the data,
they claimed it was a public service exposing the ‘fraud, deceit,
and stupidity’ of users looking to cheat on their signicant others
(Isidore and Goldman, 2015). e data dump resulted in devastating
outcomes for some users, including divorces, suicides, hate crimes,
and extortion emails (Baraniuk, 2015; Segall, 2015). With primar-
ily heterosexual men as victims, here we see that dierence coded
broadly, and deemed immoral, widens the landscape of vulnera-
bility. Considering popular perceptions of porn consumption as
a masculine practice, combined with the frequent online abuse of
women, one could imagine the immediate moral dimension to data
breaches exposing women’s sexual porn consumption. And while
marginalized groups are most at risk, their vulnerabilities point to
wider implications for a society in which ostensibly private sexual
data is accessible to the extent dened in our results and combined
with a growing precedent of technological aacks based on moral
outrage and conditional understandings of the right to privacy.
6.3 Sex, Porn, and the Complications of
Consent
We argue our ndings reveal troubling violations by porn sites
(and other industrial actors trading in porn consumption data), of
users’ sexual privacy and autonomy. Porn website privacy poli-
cies are long, dense, dicult to understand, and only 11% of the
third-parties observed tracking users on a given page are listed
in the policy, leaving users ignorant of which organizations may
be assembling catalogues of their perceived sexual interests. e
potentially catastrophic and certainly oen violent consequences
of past (and undoubtedly future) sexual privacy breaches are reec-
tive of problematic norms of sexual consent in a patriarchal and
heteronormative rape culture. e language of ‘consent’ is oen
mobilized in online privacy policies and other legalese related to
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the use of personal data. Yet, our results point to parallels in the
dubious understandings of consent seen in intimate sexual encoun-
ters and in online sexual activity. We argue both in-person and
online sexual activity alike (including online porn consumption)
must be conducted only when armative consent has been granted.
In the case of private sexual data, such as that which leaks from
porn websites, the limitations of the user’s ability to consent are
currently so egregious they create numerous opportunities for vi-
olence, blackmail, and discrimination, and constitute a clear and
present danger to those who consume online pornography.
In interpersonal interactions, sexual consent is oen mistaken
to mean ‘no means no, and silence means yes.’ However, policy
makers are increasingly working to (re)dene sexual consent as
necessarilyarmative: silence does not equal consent, someone
must communicate their consent for true sexual autonomy. Further,
Citron (2019: 1882) notes, ‘Consent facilitated by sexual privacy is
contextual and nuanced - it does not operate like an on-o switch.’
In 2015, all New York schools adopted an armative denition
of sexual consent, stating: ‘Consent can be given by words or
actions, as long as those words or actions create clear permission
regarding willingness to engage in the sexual activity. Silence or
lack of resistance, in and of itself, does not demonstrate consent’
(Delamater, 2015: 591). Sexual consent is increasingly, and we
believe usefully, conceptualized in this way.
In most U.S. online privacy policies consent is ideally, ‘based on
the idea that individual social media users make conscious, rational,
and autonomous choices about the disclosure of their personal
data’ (Custers et al., 2014: 270). However, the actual use of personal
data usually does not live up to this ideal. Oen websites (that
somewhere contain a privacy policy) assume user consent to any
potential outcomes of their use of the site, despite users not saying
or doing anything signaling agreement. And indeed, most users
interact very lile or not at all with privacy policies and tools for
consenting to the use of personal data (Larose and Rifon, 2006;
Custers et al., 2014). 52% of Americans do not understand what a
privacy policy is (Smith, 2014). A nationwide survey found 65% of
respondents mistakenly believed if a site contains a privacy policy,
their information will not be shared without permission (Turow
et al., 2015a). In fact, there is no legal requirement in the U.S. for
a website to have a privacy policy, and the mere existence of a
policy does not mean user privacy is protected, only that users are
informed of practices. In the U.S. it is perfectly legal to have a
privacy policy explicitly stating porn browsing data will be sold.
us, consent online is at best opaque and misunderstood, and at
worst, intentionally deceptive.
Sexual consent is carried out within systems of power, and con-
sent becomes especially murky when there is a power imbalance
between participants. Dougherty (2015: 238) argues consent is like
a promise, and promises can ‘protect individuals from imbalances of
power within a relationship.’ Our results reveal a troubling power
imbalance in the negotiation of users’ private sexual data. Some of
the world’s largest and most powerful corporations have access to
this data. Not only are users oen unable to truly give consent to
the collection and use of their private sexual data; if an ‘agreement’
is breached, the power dierence between the user and corporation
is so vast the user has lile recourse or protection.
e similarities between online and oine violations of consent
have not gone unnoticed online where metaphors of sexual violence
proliferate. Chun and Friendland (2015: 15), citing internet culture
examples like ‘frape,’ ‘#rapeface,’ and ‘pwned,’ argue the word ‘rape’
is increasingly popular online ‘. . . to suggest the possibility of on-
line subjects dominating, violating, or transforming other online
subjects.’ e consequences of exposure of sexual data certainly
imply the violence associated with such internet parlance. In the
case of ‘sextortion,’ in which people are blackmailed into perform-
ing sexual acts so aackers won’t release their sexual images/data,
Citron (2019:1925) notes, ‘victims have described feeling like they
were “virtually raped.”’
Alarmingly, regulators oen decline to act in the face of user
vulnerability to privacy violations:
With the exception of certain forms of health and
nancial information. . . companies continue to be
free to collect huge streams of individuals’ data. . .
to construct proles of individuals with the data,
to share the data, and to treat people dierently. . .
based on conclusions drawn from those hidden
surveillance activities. (Turow et al., 2015a: 8)
e reality of user vulnerabilities when consuming porn online,
especially considering the leakage and data specicity identied
herein, combined with our privacy policy results, lead us to argue
that the ability to consent to the collection, use, or exposure of this
personal sexual data constitutes a form of sexual consent. us,
it ought to be as carefully considered, dened, and regulated as
interpersonal sexual consent14. Dougherty (2015: 227) argued ar-
mative consent is needed, ‘in the case of high-stakes consent…with
sexual consent as a paradigm of high-stakes consent.’ We can not
imagine many online privacy concerns more high-stakes than those
identied in this study, and so we argue users’ armative consent
should be obtained by porn sites holding such sensitive data15. As
in any sexual interaction, silence must not be mistaken for consent,
and individuals should have a clear understanding of the power
dynamics of the sexual exchange they are entering when visiting
porn sites, as well as the procedures for withdrawing consent.16
7 CONCLUSION
RQ1 asked to what extent porn websites reveal user data and al-
low for third-party tracking. We have demonstrated they leak
data through third-party requests to a large and concerning extent.
RQ2 asked who has access to the data and whether the access is
disclosed in the sites’ privacy policies. We have shown the data
are oen accessed by large corporations, parties usually not iden-
tied in porn site privacy policies as having access to user data.
RQ3 asked whether users’ sexual interests might be revealed in
the surveillance and tracking of porn usage. e user data oen
suggests or reveals gender/sexual identities or interests represented
in the porn site URL accessed, and thus poses an additional risk if
tracked and assumptions about users’ sexual identities/interests are
14Interpersonal sexual consent, though more aended to than the issues we highlight
here, also remains poorly dened and regulated (Citron, 2019).
15How such consent might be conceptualized, and ultimately, implemented, is beyond
the scope of this article; we believe recognition of the stakes we’ve described can be a
useful starting point.
16See Custers (2016) on the need for expiration dates for online informed consent.
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linked to personal identifying information. RQ4 asked about the
potential implications of porn website tracking and surveillance.
rough our results and connections to past porn site privacy and
security breaches and controversies, we demonstrate that the singu-
larity of porn data and the characteristics of typical porn websites’
lax security measures mean this leakiness poses a unique and ele-
vated threat. We have argued everyone is at risk when such data
is accessible without users’ consent, and thus can potentially be
leveraged against them by malicious agents acting on moralistic
claims of normative gender or sexuality. ese risks are heightened
for vulnerable populations whose porn usage might be classied
as non-normative or contrary to their public life. Finally, we argue
porn sites currently operate with an unethical denition of sexual
consent considering the sensitive sexual data they hold. We con-
tend the overwhelming leakiness and sexual exposure revealed in
our results mean porn sites ought to beer account for user security
as well as adopt policies based on armative consent.
Despite these risks, maintaining private access to online porn
is crucial for all. Porn oen serves educational, exploratory and
liberatory – or ‘sex positive’ – outcomes. When sexual ‘norms’
are potentially upheld and leveraged by the state or other agents,
every citizen is ultimately at risk of being labeled ‘non-normative’
or pathological. Such online privacy risks and oine bodily and
reputational risks can lead to unequal power relations and the
moving underground -and associated marginalization- of minority
(a constantly in-ux and culturally-contingent category) sexual
interests and identities. Others have theorized approaches to online
and sexual privacy concerns that we nd useful and promising in
light of our results17. And we recognize the theoretical and political
power of Chun and Friedland’s (2015: 3) contention that:
We need to ght for the right to take risks—to be
in public—and not be aacked. . . . (and) by build-
ing new forms of interaction that cannot ‘leak’
because they do not seek to create imaginary bub-
bles of privacy between users in the rst place.
However, our results reveal just how susceptible our sexual data
is to accidental or hostile exposure and thus, to moral targeting,
on- and oine violence, and other negative consequences. Our
data lend weight to Citron’s (2019: 1877) warning that, ‘anks to
networked technologies, sexual privacy can be invaded at scale and
from across the globe.’ While we should always work toward ex-
posing the constructed and complex nature of ‘normalcy’ (Warner,
1999), we have demonstrated an imperative to swily and prag-
matically address and disrupt the current and ongoing widespread
leakiness of online porn sites.
While the ndings of this study are far from encouraging, we
do believe regulatory intervention may have positive outcomes.
e form of consent currently found in U.S. self-regulatory ‘opt-
out’ systems fails to meet sexual consent norms and reinforces the
‘blame the victim’ mentality that oen emerges in slut shaming
and other forms of sexual violence. Scholars are not immune from
17See Citron (2019) on sexual privacy, Plummer’s (2003) concept of ‘intimate citizen-
ship,’ and Baruh and Popescu’s (2017: 592) argument that regulatory eorts ought
to ‘recognize the nature of privacy as both a collective value and a collective social
phenomenon,’ rather than traditional individualist understandings of privacy self-
management.
such aitudes as evidenced by the ‘privacy paradox’ which implic-
itly holds users responsible for privacy violations rather than the
powerful actors conducting surveillance. In contrast, the European
Union’s GDPR formulation of online tracking consent more closely
matches norms for sexual consent by emphasizing consent must
be armative and freely given, thereby providing greater protec-
tions to users. Our results demonstrate the imperative to aend to
outcomes of the GDPR and to develop models of armative digital
consent for porn websites that meet the diverse requirements for
providing and withdrawing consent in sexual interactions.
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